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ANTITRUST PROSECUTIONS OF INTERNATIONAL
BUSINESS
ISRAEL B. OSEAS
The problem of the application of our antitrust laws to combinations of
foreign and domestic business enterprises has for some years been receiving
attention from the Department of Justice. This attention has been intensified
by the war. In a number of public statements officials of the Department
of Justice have stated that international arrangements to which domestic
corporations are parties have exerted an influence -harmful to our national
interests,' and the Department has announced its intention "to carry out
actively the policy of outlawing the cartel system."
'2
The political and economic implications of the cartel system have been
widely discussed. The line separating desirable collaboration between na-
tionals of different countries from monopolistic restrictions on international
trade will take much defining. The problems confronting the practicing
lawyer, however, are not ordinarily these larger questions. His problems
are apt to fall into two general classes. The first is a substantive question.
What is the law with respect to the matters coffered in this agreement, actual
or proposed, on which his advice is sought? The second, usually arising
when some action by the government is taken or threatened, is: What can
the government do to his client? What is it likely to do? What is its policy?
It is the second class of questions that will be discussed here. The answers
to these questions are not to be found, for the most part, in decisions of courts,
but in Departmental policy and practice. Accordingly, I shall discuss only
briefly the decisions of the Supreme Court dealing with jurisdiction in this
type of case. The main part of this article will be devoted to a chronological
review of the principal foreign monopoly prosecutions, a discussion of the
enforcement techniques used by the government in its attacks on foreign
'See N. Y. Times, July 29, 1942, p. 13, col. 6; N. Y. Times Mag., Sept. 26, 1943,
p. 12; N. Y. Times, Jan, 7. 1944, p. 1, col. 8; CORWIN D. EDWARDS, ECONOMIC AND
POLITICAL AsPEcTs OF INTERNATIONAL CARTELS, prepared for Subcommittee on War
Mobilization of the Committee on Military Affairs, United States Senate, 78th Cong.,
2d Sess.; address of Attorney General Biddle to Harvard Law School Alumni Associa-
tion, Feb. 23, 1944. For a contrary view, see J. COM., Jan. 14, 1944, p. 9, col. 5; J. CoM.,
Feb. 4, 1944, p. 10, col. 6; DEHAAs, Economic Peace Through Private Agreements
(1943) 22 HARV. Bus. Rlv. 139.2Department of Justice Release, June 28, 1943. Whether this policy will stand un-
modified is doubtful. The Department of Justice viewpoint is apparently under pressure
from other government agencies as well as business interests. See Editorial, N. Y.
Herald Tribune, Apr. 29, 1944; N. Y. Times, June 15, 1944, p. 6, col. 5; N. Y. Times,
June 25, 1944, p. 30, col. 6; Editorial, J. COM., June 26, 1944.
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monopolies, and an examination of antitrust policy as revealed in consent
decrees.'
This discussion will also be confined to the problems raised by the activi-
ties of the ordinary commercial or manufacturing company and will not deal
with specialized problems, such as those of carriers or export trade associa-
tions which are governed by special legislation.4
JURISDICTION-THE SUPREME COURT DECISIONS
Three Supreme Court decisions have dealt directly with the problem of the
application of the antitrust laws to situations involving foreign restraints of
commerce. They are: American Banaca Co. v. United Fruit Co.,5 United
States v. Pacific & Arctic Railway & Navigation Co., et al.,' and United
States v. Sisal Sales Corp.
1
American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co. was a civil action under the
Sherman Act for treble damages. From a judgment of the Circuit Court
of Appeals, Second Circuit, affirming a dismissal of the complaint for failure
to state a cause of action, the plaintiff brought error in the Supreme Court.
Plaintiff was an Alabama corporation; defendant, a New Jersey corporation.
It was alleged that defendant, long before the formation of tlii plaintiff
corporation, had been engaged in restraining trade. In 1909, one McConnell
started a banana plantation in Panama, then a part of the Republic of Colum-
bia, and began to build a railway. He was notified by the defendant to com-
bine or stop. Two months later the governor of Panama recommended to
his government that Costa Rica be allowed to administer the territory through
which the railway was to run. Defendant and the government of Costa
Rica interfered with McConnell and his work. In November, 1903, Panama
revolted. In June, 1904, plaintiff bought out McConnell and continued with
the work. In July, Costa Rican soldiers and officials at the instigation of the
defendant seized the plantation and supplies and stopped the construction
of the railway. In August, one Astua by ex parte proceedings, obtained a
judgment from a Costa Rican court declaring that the plantation should be
his. The proceedings by which this was done were alleged to be without
3The value of consent decrees as material for study has been questioned in THE
NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL CONFERENCE BOARD, INC., PUBLIC REGULATION OF COMPETITIVE
PRAcTICEs (1929) 26. Cf. Oseas, Book Review (1930) 30 COL. L. REV. 593.4See 39 STAT. 728 (1916), 46 U. S. C. 801 (1941) ; 39 STAT. 733 (1916), 46 U. S. C.
814 (1941) ; 40 STAT. 516 (1918), 15 U. S. C. 61 (1941). The first prosecution of an
export trade association was filed on March 16, 1944. United States v. Alkali Export
Association, Inc., Civil No. 24-464 (S. D. N. Y.).
5213 U. S. 347, 29 Sup. Ct. 511 (1909).
6228 U. S. 87, 33 Sup. Ct. 443 (1913).
7274 U. S. 268, 47 Sup. Ct. 592 (1927).
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jurisdiction and void. Agents of the defendant then bought the property.
The plaintiff was unable to induce the government of Costa Rica to with-
draw its soldiers. Plaintiff was deprived of his plantation and railway. It
was also alleged that defendant had, by outbidding, driven purchasers from
the matrket. The Supreme Court held that no cause of action was stated.
In considering the holding of this case, it is important to note that it
was a private action for treble damages and not a government prosecution.
While the complaint alleged that the defendants had been engaged in prior
restraints of trade in the United States, no connection was shown between
such restraints and any injury suffered by plaintiff. A private party has
no cause of action based merely on the existence of a conspiracy, but only
on injury to him,s and the substantial allegations of the complaint were
restricted to activities abroad which had resulted in damage to plaintiff.
Such a complaint poses a relatively simple problem in conflict of laws.
Mr. Justice Holmes stated the applicable principle succinctly :9
But the general and almost universal rule is that the character of an
act as lawful or unlawful must be determined wholly by the law of the
country where the act is done.
The Court had no difficulty in concluding that the Sherman Act is not
one of those unusual exercises of extra-territorial sovereignty, such as punish-
ment of offenses on the high seas. While recognizing the power of Con-
gress in a variety of situations to apply our law extraterritorially, it decided
that Congress had shown no intent to do so in the Sherman Act.
10
Consideration by the Court of the further complication in this case, the
effect of the intervention of a sovereign state, was therefore not necessary
to the decision. It furnished merely an additional ground for coming to the
conclusion that no tort had been alleged in the complaint.
The missing elements-local activity and local monopoly-were supplied
in the next case to reach the Supreme Court. In United States v. Pacific and
Arctic Railway and Navigation Co., et al., the defendants were indicted for
violating the Sherman Act. The combination alleged was between a shipping
company, whose vessels plied between the United States and Alaskan and
Canadian ports, and Canadian railways. The purpose, made effective by an
838 STAT. 731 (1914), 15 U. S. C. 15 (1941); Gerli v. Silk Ass'n of America, 36
F. (2d) 959 (S. D. N. Y. 1929); Gibbs v. McNeeley, 102 Fed. 594 (C. C. Wash.
1900); Twin Ports Oil Co. v. Pure Oil Co., 119 F. (2d) 747 (C. C. A. 8th, 1941);
Roseland v. Phister Mfg. Co., 125 F. (2d) 417 (C. C. A. 3d, 1942) ; Beegle v. Thomson,
138 F. (2d) 875 (C. C. A. 7th, 1943).
9213 U. S. 347, 356, 29 Sup. Ct. 511, 512 (1909).
'OCf. United States v. Bowman, 260 U. S. 94, 43 Sup. Ct. 39 (1922).
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agreement to charge excessive wharfage at Skagway, was to monopolize the
water route from the United States. The defendants relied on the American
Banana case as holding that our courts had no jurisdiction over foreign car-
riage. The Court readily conceded that our antitrust laws had no extra-
territorial operation but held that the-operation in our territory was sufficient
to confer jurisdiction.
United States v. Sisal Sales Corp. was even clearer. There, the bill
(drawn under both the Sherman Act and the Wilson Tariff Law,"), as
interpreted by the Supreme Court, charged a conspiracy, entered into and
made effective by acts within the United States, to restrain trade in the
importation of commodities into the United States and to increase domestic
prices. The Court held the combination illegal. Although the conspiracy
included acts done abroad and under the sanction of foreign law and acts
of sovereignty, there was sufficient domestic activity to bring the situation
within the coverage of our laws.
The result reached in the foregoing cases wbuld seem to follow logically
also from the decisions of the Supreme Court dealing with the situs of a
conspiracy for purpose of venue. Although the Sherman Act punishes com-
mon law conspiracies, i.e., without requiring the commission of an overt
act, a conspiracy has been held to exist either where it was entered into or
wherever an act was done to carry it out. 2 Therefore, if either the unlaw-
ful agreement was entered into in the United States or any act to make
it effective was done here, our courts would have jurisdiction.
THE: EARLY CASES
In 1912, the United States brought a suit in equity in an attempt to break
up a coffee control plan.'3 The bill alleged legislation procured in Brazil
pursuant to which a control committee, resident abroad, made. bank loans
which were used to purchase large quantities of coffee and hold it off the
market. It was alleged that some 900,000 bags of coffee were held in New
York warehouses pursuant to the plan and that such quantities as the con-
trol committee determined had been withdrawn and sold in the New York
market by an American agent of the committee who concededly had acted
M37 STAT. 667 (1913), 15 U. S. C. 8 (1940); 36 STAT. 1167 (1911), 15 U. S. C. 9
(1940).
12Nash v. United States, 229 U. S. 373, 33 Sup. Ct. 780 (1913); United States v.
Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U. S. 392, 47 Sup. Ct. 377 (1927) ; United States-v. Socony-
Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U. S. 150, 60 Sup. Ct. 811 (1940). For a discussion of the logic
of the decisions dealing with venue, see United States v. New York Great Atlantic &
Pacific Tea Co. Inc., 137 F. (2d) 459 (C. C. A. 5th, 1943).
'3 United States v. Sielcken et al., Equity No. 9-188 (S. D. N. Y. 1912).
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abroad. Service was made on the American agent and on the company
operating the warehouse in which the coffee was stored. A temporary re-
straining order was obtained, restraining the transfer of the coffee. The
defendants demurred to the bill. Before further proceedings were taken, the
Government of Brazil entered into diplomatic negotiations with the United
States Government; the coffee was sold and the proceeding was dismissed
by stipulation.
After the American Banana case and before the Pacific and Arctic Railway
case, the government brought several actions against steamship companies
engaged in operating ships between American and foreign ports. United
States v. Hamburg-Amerikanische-Packet-Fahrt A.G.14 is typical of these.
The petition charged a conspiracy to allocate quotas, fix rates, pool receipts
and fight competitors. The defendants demurred. In overruling the demur-
rer, the court said :1
Citizens of foreign countries are not free to restrain or monopolize the
foreign commerce of this country by entering into combinations abroad
nor by employing foreign vessels to effect their purpose. Such combi-
nations are to be tested by the same standard as similar combinations
entered into here by citizens of this country. The vital question in all
cases is the same: Is the combination to so operate in this country as
to directly and materially affect our foreign commerce? As said by the
Circuit Court of Appeals for this Circuit in Thomsen v. Union Castle
Mail S.S. Co., 166 Fed. 251, 92 C. C. A. 315:
"That the combination was formed in a foreign country is likewise
immaterial. It affected the foreign commerce of this country and was to
be put into operation here."
When the case reached the Supreme Court, however, the European War
was in progress. Taking judicial notice of the war, the Court was of the
opinion that it had rendered the controversy moot and therefore directed that
the bill be dismissed without prejudice to the right of the government to
sue thereafter if the conspiracy were renewed. 16 The same disposition was
made of two simihik cases against other steamship companies.' 7
In 1918, the government indicted the Sumatra Purchasing Corporation
(United States v. Sumatra Purchasing Co.)s under the Sherman Act and
\Wilson Tariff Act. The case was essentially an American case, for although
14200 Fed. 806 (S. D. N. Y. 1911).
15Id. at 807.
' 6United States v. Hamburg-Amerikanische-Packet-Fahrt A.G., 239 U. S. 466, 36
Sup. Ct. 212 (1916).
17United States v. American-Asiatic S.S. Co., United States v. Prince Line, 242 U. S.
537, 37 Sup. Ct. 233 (1917).
'sCriminal No. 15-35-36 (S. D. N. Y. 1920).
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foreign elements were involved, the plan to which the government objected
was entered into and carried out by Americans for their business interests.
The case was settled by a consent decree 9 and a plea of nolo coniendere
to the violation of the Sherman Act.
On April 7, 1927, the United States instituted a suit in equity against
the Franco-German Potash syndicate (United States v. Deutsches Kalisyn-
dikat Gesellschaft, et al.°). The petition alleged the existence of contracts
between the French group and its American agent and between the German
group and its American agent, which contracts were alleged to be severally
in restraint of trade under the Sherman Act and the Wilson Tariff Act. It
set out the terms of a syndicate agreement which provided for fixed partici-
pations of each group in American business and for the creation of a single
exclusive selling agency in the United States. It was further alleged that
French and German representatives of the syndicate were at that moment
in New York for the purpose of setting up the agency and agreeing upon
the terms and conditions of sale of potash imported into the United States. '
19Equity No. 17-317 (S. D. N. Y. 1920). Petition filed and consent decree entered
April 13, 1920. The plea of ioo contendere was entered the same day.
2°Equity No. 41-124 (S. D. N. Y. 1929).21The activities of the German Potash syndicate had previously come to the attention
of the Department of Justice. On Oct. 5, 1910, the Solicitor General gave an opinion
to the Secretary of State. In it he described a German law to raise the export prices
of potash salts through the formation of a syndicate of mine owners. It was stated
that the syndicate had established connections with a corporation known as the German
Kali Works organized under the laws of New York with offices in New York City.
After quoting the Wlilson Tariff Act he went on to say that a law of ,'the Gearman
government cannot itself constitute a combination within the meaning of the Act, but
a statute of the German Empire cannot protect citizens of that country and still less
American citizens from consequences of the acts done within the jurisdiction of the
United States in violation of its laws. Acts done pursuant to agreement valid in Ger-
many, which would result in restraint of trade, would be subject to the laws of this
country. He then analyzed the agreement and concluded that it went further than the
German law and then stated:
"This fact alone, without going into the details of the agreement, is sufficient to
show beyond question that the combination is not protected by the German Act and
is such as the Act of Congress condemns, and the only question is whether or not the
combination or igreement is made by or between persons or corporations either of
whom is engaged in importing potash into the United States....
" ... either the Ahmerican corporation is a selling agent of the syndicate, which is
composed of the mine owners, and the potash when shipped is consigned to it as such
agent, or this corporation is a purchaser of the goods from the syndicate, and as such
purchaser has agreed to handle the entire supply from the mines which are embraced
in the syndicate at the prices fixed by this combination, and in accordance with its
provisions, and has thereby either become a party to the agreement or has entered into
an independent agreement of the same character. In either event, I think the statute
.would apply, because, in the first instance, the importer would be the German syndi-
cate, or rather the various mine owners who under the combination have made the
syndicate their agent, and, in the second instance, the American corporation would be
the importer, which by its contract has become a party to this or another unlawful
combination." 31 Op. A. G. 545 (1919).
1944]
CORNELL LAW QUARTERLY
Subpoenas were served on the representatives of the French and German
groups while discussions were still under way, and so service was obtained
not only on the American parties but also on the principal foreign entities
involved.
The French Ambassador appeared specially, together with the French de-
fendants, and asserted a claim of sovereign immunity on their behalf. This
was based on his certificate that the French Government was the owner of
Societ6 Commerciale des Potasses d'Alsace, the French corporation involved.
and that the suit was therefore in effect against the French Government. The
District Court upheld the service.22 The case was settled by the entry of a
consent decree.
The next foreign group to be attacked by the government was the Dutch
quinine monopoly (United States v. 383,340 Ounces of Quinine Deriva-
tives).2 Ninety per cent of the world's supply of cinchona bark (from which
quinine is made) was grown on the Island of Java. Virtually all of the
planters were members of an organization that limited production. An or-
ganization in Amsterdam, called the Kina Bureau, allocated the bark to thir-
teen manufacturers, located in Holland, Germany, France, England, Japan,
and the United States. Prices of the manufactured product, including prices
in the United States, were fixed and a very close control was kept over the
whole world trade to prevent competition.
The principal problem confronting the government was how to obtain
jurisdiction over. the Dutch interests which had control of the situation.
While there were two manufacturers of quinine, an importer and several
manufacturers of quinine products within the country, it was obvious that
control lay abroad.
The government moved simultaneously on three fronts against the monop-
oly. On March 23, 1928, customs agents armed with-search warrants seized
383,340 ounces of assorted quinine derivatives of a value of approximately
one hundred- fifty thousand dollars, representing about a year's supply of
quinine for the United States. On March 29, 1928, a bill in equity was
filed seeking injunctive relief ;24 on March 30, an indictment was returned.25
On April 23, a libel was filed in the United States District Court for the
Southern District of New York, praying for a forfeiture of the goods seized.26
22United States v. Deutsches Kalisyndikat Gesellschaft et al., 31 F. (2d) 199 (S. D.
N. Y. 1929).23Admiralty No. 98-242 (S. D. N. Y. 1928).'
24United States v. N.V. Amsterdamsche Chininefabriek et al., Equity No. 44-384
(S. D. N. Y. 1928).25Criminal No. 54-546 (S. D. N. Y. 1928).26United States v. 383,340 Ounces of Quinine Derivatives, Admiralty No. 98-242
(S. D. N. Y. 1928).
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The forfeiture procedure was novel. Although there is a forfeiture pro-
vision in the Sherman Act,2 7 it has been used only once.28 These proceedings
were brought under a similar provision of the Wilson Tariff Act 2 which had
not been invoked before. The Wilson Tariff Act rather than the Sherman
Act was used because of the broader provision of the former. While under
the Sherman Act it is provided that property to be seized must be in the
course of transportation, there is no such requirement in the Wilson Tariff
Act.
This drastic procedure was effective. The business of importing quinine
derivatives in the United States was interrupted and proceeded thereafter
only, in effect, under license from the Antitrust Division.
The forfeiture proceeding was intended to accomplish two primary pur-
poses. By seizing a valuable asset of the foreign defendants, the government
placed upon them the burden of litigating the issues under penalty of for-
feiture of their property and an embargo on their business with this country.
It also assured the citizens of this country of a temporary source of supply
of a necessary commodity in the event of protracted litigation. The govern-
ment was successful. The Dutch defendants appeared and negotiated a con-
sent decree. Upon the entry of the decree, the other proceedings were
dismissed.
A similar procedure was followed in the Norwegian Sardine case (United
States v. 5898 Cases of Sardines etc.)30 instituted two years later. No in-
dictment was sought but the government seized a quantity of sardines in a
warehouse in New York. Three days later a bill in equity was filed naming
fifty Norwegian packers and a dozen American agents as defendants. The
2726 STAT. 210 (1890), 15 U. S. C. 6 (1940).
"FoaRaTua OF PoPmrY IN TRANsIT. Any property owned under any contract or
by any combination, or pursuant to any conspiracy (and being the subject thereof)
mentioned in section 1 of this title, and being in the course of transportation from
one State to another, or to a foreign country, shall be forfeited to the United States,
and may be seized and condemned by like proceedings as those provided by law for the
forfeiture, seizure, and condemnation of property imported into the United States con-
trary to law."28United States v. One Hundred and Seventy-Five Cases of Cigarettes (E. D. Va.
Oct. 28, 1907).
2937 STAT. 667 (1913), 15 U. S. C. 11 (1940).
"FoRFzrrup oP PROPERTY IN TRANSIT. Any property owned under any contract or
by any combination, or pursuant to any conspiracy, and being the subject thereof, men-
tioned in section 8 of this title, imported into and being within the United States or
being in the course of transportation from one State to another, or to or from a Terri-
tory or the District of Columbia, shall be forfeited to the United States, and may be
seized and condemned by like proceedings as those provided by law or the forfeiture,
seizure, and condemnation of property imported into the United States, contrary to law."
30 Admiralty No. 105-37 (S. D. N. Y. 1930).
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foreign defendants all appeared, a consent decree was negotiated and the
seized goods were thereupon released.
During this period a petition in equity was filed against a combination
of owners of Canadian Asbestos mines.3' The petition alleged a combination
in restraint of trade under the Sherman and Wilson Tariff Acts in the im-
portation of Canadian asbestos. The case, however, was not carried through
to a decree. Service of process was quashed as to one defendant3 2 and
thereafter the case was dismissed because the issues had become moot.
THE PRESENT DRIVE AGAINST CARTELS
A number of actions,33 civil and criminal, have been brought against for-
eign monopolies during the time roughly corresponding with the period of
the present war. They are directed against restraints in the fields of light
metals, chemicals, electrical products, petroleum, and glass. Most of them
aim at alleged German economic control over our industry. These combina-
tions are usually described as international cartels. The term is loosely used.
From an inspection of the complaints they may be defined as combinations
created by contract among powerful companies or groups of companies, each
occupying a position of dominance in its own country, for the purpose of
dividing world markets. In general, the intent of these agreements is to
leave each party dominant in its own home market, free from fear of com-
petition from its normal competitors in other countries.
This division of territory usually accompanies agreements for divisions of
profits and agreements for exchange of technical information and licensing
of patents and trade marks. Certain kinds of manufacturing may be. re-
served to some of the parties.
Some of these combinations are exceedingly complex. A description of a
cartel taken from the complaint in the case of United States v. Aluininam
Company of Anteric a 4 will serve as an illustration of this type of combi-
nation:
14. On or about March 4, 1927, defendants DOW (Dow Chemical
Company) and AMC (American Magnesium Corporation) entered into
an agreement to cross-license certain patents relating to the fabrica-
tion of magnesium. Dow and AMC were each given the right-to issue
3'United States v. Asbestos Corporation, Limited, et al., Equity No. 44-268 (S. D.
N. Y. 1928).
3234 F. (2d) 182 (S. D. N. Y. 1929).
33See.Appendix.
34Civil No. 18-31 (S. D. N. Y. 1942). For a picture of "world cartelization" (the
words are the government's) of the chemical industry, see the complaint in United
States v. Imperial Chemical Industries, et al., Civil No. 24-13 (S. D. N. Y. 1944).
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sub-licenses under those patents on condition that the sub-licensee use
magnesium produced by either party.
15. At some time during the period between March 4, 1927, and on
or about August 31, 1927, defendants Dow, AMC, and Alcoa (Alumi-
num Company of America) entered into an agreeme nt whereby AMC
agreed to purchase, and did purchase, all of its requirements of mag-
nesium from Dow, and AMC agreed to stop, and did stop, producing
magnesium. At all times thereafter defendant AMC obtained its require-
ments of magnesium from defendant Dow at prices more favorable than
those prices quoted other purchasers from Dow. At all times thereafter
defendant Alcoa obtained its requirements of magnesium from defendant
AMC.
16. On or about October 23, 1931, defendant Alcoa entered into a
contract (hereinafter referred to as the Alig agreement) with I. G.
Farbenindustrie (hereinafter refered to as I. G. Farben), a corporation
or association organized and existing under the laws of Germany. This
contract, among other things, provided:
a. The two companies would form a third company [subsequently
organized as defendant MDC (Magnesitim Development Corpora-
tion)] to be equally owned and jointly controlled by them.
b. Each company would assign to MDC its then owned and sub-
sequently acquired United States patents relating to the production
and fabrication of magnesium.
c. MDC would grant royalty-free fabrication licenses under all
fabrication patents to Alcoa and I. G. Farben.
d. No licenses were to be granted for the production of mag-
nesium under any patents held by MDC without the affirmative vote
of the majority of the directors of MDC.
e. Neither of the companies would engage in the production of
magnesium in the United States without offering the other party an
equal participation.
17. Pursuant to the Alig agreement the defendant Alcoa and I. G.
Farben organized defendant MDC and transferred to it all of the United
States patents owned by defendant Alcoa and by I. G. Farben relating
to the production and fabrication of magnesium.
18. On or about February 8, 1933, defendant Alcoa entered into a
contract with I. G. Farben, according to the terms of which I. G. Farben
was given the right to subscribe to 50% of the stock of defendant AMC.
The parties agreed that neither was thereafter to fabricate magnesium
products in the United States independently of defendant AMC, thereby
eliminating competition between themselves in the fabrication of mag-
nesium products. In addition, the parties agreed to conclude certain
pending negotiations with defendant Dow which had as their objective
prevention of competition in the production of magnesium by the defend-
ants Alcoa and AMC and I. G. Farben, on the one hand, and defendant
Dow on the other, and for the further purpose of controlling price com-
petition in the sale of magnesium products.
1944]
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19. On or about June 24, 1933, defendant AMC entered into a con-
tract with defendant Dow providing for the purchase by AMC of its
magnesium requirements from Dow at lower prices than any other cus-
tomer of Dow.
20. On or about January 1, 1934, defendants Dow, AMC, and MDC
entered into an agreement by the terms of which, defendants Dow and
MDC cross-licensed each other under the patents then owned and sub*-
sequently to be acquired by each relative to the fabrication of magnesium
with the right granted to each to sublicense others under such patents.
These patents comprised the great bulk of patents relating to the fabrica-
tion of magnesium products in the United States and largely dominated
such fabrication.
21. Defendant AMC has never issued sublicenses for the fabrication
of magnesium products. Defendant Dow has refused to issue sublicenses
to many persons deciding to fabricate magnesium products and has
granted a limited number of sublicenses to certain other persons. De-
fendant Dow has compelled and required each prospective sublicensee,
as a condition precedent to the issuance of a sublicense, to enter into a
purchase contract with defendant Dow for its requirements of mag-
nesium.
22. Defendant Dow by various special arrangements with its sub-
licensees has adopted, and at all times enforced, a policy of limiting and
controlling competition among its sublicensees on the one hand and be-
tween its sublicensees and itself on the other hand.
23. On or about September 5, 1934, defendant Dow entered into an
agreement with I. G. Farben whereby I. G. Farben agreed to purchase
certain quantities of magnesium from defendant Dow and defendant
Dow agreed that it would not otherwise export any magnesium to
Europe except for a specified limited annual quantity to a designated
licensee in England. By its terms this agreement could not be terminated
by either party until January 1, 1938.
24. On or about November 23, 1938, defendant AMC entered into
a contract for the purchase of magnesium from defendant Dow. This
agreement, effective for a period of five years after the termination of
the contract of June 24, 1933, hereinbefore referred to, was similar to
the agreement of June 24, 1933, in terms and effect.
All the foreign monopoly cases during this period, except United States v.
The Tannin Corporation,85 have involved this type of combination. That
case, similar to the Sardine case already described, involved a combination
among producers to fix prices of quebracho, a tanning agent produced in
South America.
Some of these actions are pending; some of the criminal cases have been
35Civil No. 23-510 (S. D. N. Y. 1943); Criminal No. 18-31 (S. D. N. Y. 1942).
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terminated by pleas of nolo contendere; in some, there have been consent
decrees.3 6 None has been tried.
PROBLEMS iN EFFECTIVE ENFORCEMENT
Classification of the problems involved in the cases discussed is difficult.
The Sherman Act makes no such classification. The following groups are
not mutually exclusive and are not necessarily all that may arise.
The foreign monopoly cases seem to fall into three major classes.
1. The transportation cases-These involve combinations of transporta-
tion companies operating between the United States and a foreign country.
Parties to this combination may be both Americans and foreigners. The
restraints affect carriage from or to our shores. Jurisdiction over such cases
has been held to apply in the Pacific and Arctic Railway case.87
These cases heretofore have posed no specially difficult problems of en-
forcement. There is always jurisdiction over the party to the combination
that touches our shores. This party may be either a domestic or a foreign
corporation, but, in any event, it is always physically present here because
of the nature of its business. It can, therefore, be indicted or enjoined from
participating in discriminatory practices.
2. The import cases-These involve restraints of trade in an imported
article. In moving against them the government has found the Wilson Tariff
Act helpful.- Such cases may present many variations in form. The usual
parties to the combination are an importer or a group of importers and a
foreign shipper or producer. From the point of view of effective enforce-
ment, the place of control-is important.
Control may be in the United States, as it was in the Sumatra and Sisal
cases. If so, the problem for the Department of Justice is simplified. Be-
cause there is jurisdiction over all the necessary parties, an attack may be
made directly on the head of the conspiracy. With the head lopped off, the
foreign limbs will die of themselves.
A much more difficult problem is presented for the Department of Justice
if control is abroad. The situation is illustrated by the Potash, Quinine,
and Sardine cases. The effectiveness of the prosecution then will depend
upon the strength of the combination, for unlike the previous situation, the
government is in a position to hack only 4t the limbs, leaving the body intact.






A reading of the terms of some of the consent decrees shows this to be
true. In the Quinine case a tightly organized monopoly, directed from Hol-
land, had control of the world supply of quinine. Control was simplified be-
cause virtually the entire supply came from Java, a Dutch colony. All the
growers of the primary raw material, cinchona bark, were parties to a
production limitation agreement and sold almost the entire world supply
to a group of Dutch manufacturers who parcelled out supplies to a limited
group of manufacturers throughout the world. Two of these were Ameri-
cans. The Dutch also had an American agent who imported their products
into the United States. Prices of the bark and the manufactured quinine
were strictly controlled. Under these circumstances, the consent decree en-
joined the defendants from:
(a) Fixing or maintaining resale prices, resale terms, resale dis-
counts, resale allotments of territory or any resale restrictions or condi-
tions whatever with respect to quinine derivatives sold to persons in or
held within the United States.
(b) Restraining, preventing or hindering in any way the shipment
and/or sale in the United States and/or the shipments or sale to, into,
or from the United States of cinchona bark'and/or quinine derivatives,
except as provided in paragraph (f) following.
(c) Participating in any arrangement for the pooling or division of
profits or territory with respect to or in consideration of any sales made
within the United States.
(d) Discriminating in any way in sales made within the United
States, between purchasers of quinine derivatives located within the
United States when such discriminations are not based on:
(1) Differences in quantities purchased;
(2) Differences in costs of delivery;
(3) Differences in competitive conditions in a particular locality;
(4) Differences in grade or quality.
But no such discrimination shall be made for the purpose of restraining
or destroying the trade of any competitor.
(e) Maintaining in force or carrying out within the United States,
any existing contracts or entering into or carrying out within the United
States, any new contracts or course of business on the condition, agree-
ment or understanding that purchasers of cinchona bark and/or quinine
derivatives only from the contracting party or parties or shall not use or
deal in the products sold by a competitor.
(f) Provided, however, that nothing herein contained shall be -con-
strued to restrain or prohibit any defendant from doing any act or enter-
ing into any agreement which is entirely completed outside the United




It is obvious that while such a -decree may place some obstacles in the
way of the smooth operation of the monopoly, the monopoly will not be
destroyed. The most that can be said is that it cannot function quite as
efficiently as before. Resale prices may no longer be maintained in our
country, permitting a measure of competition at a lower level. Our manu-
facturers may be freed from certain burdensome requirements that would
otherwise be imposed on them. With the greatest optimism we can say that
once the product reaches our shores it is no longer subject to illegal controls.
But the control at the source remains, as paragraph (f) clearly shows.
Nothing in our antitrust laws can prevent a foreign monopolist from saying:
"Here I sit in Amsterdam with the world's supply of quinine. If you want
any, you may come here and buy it on my terms."
The Potash decree is very similar to the Quinine decree. There, too, some
restraints were placed on the domestic activities of the monopoly. But no
law of ours could force the French and Germans to compete for American
business. The mechanism for their combinatioia was, in fact, set out in the
decree:
(4) Provided that no provision of this decree shall be construed to
prevent defendants from selling and delivering all Qr any part of their
potash salts outside of the United States to a corporation organized
under the laws of any country other than the 'United States regardless
of any stock ownership or other interest in said corporation by any or all
of the parties hereto; or to prevent said corporation from selling and
distributing in the United States such potash salts so acquired, through
usual facilities for sale and distribution, including agents, agencies,
branch offices, and other normal channels; ....
The Sardine prosecution, in which control also lay abroad, was successful
because, the combination was not a tightly knit monopoly well controlled at
home. Fifty Norwegian packers were held together by an agreement that
apparently was not relished by many of them. They had been accustomed
to competing among themselves for the American market, and as is usual
in such cases, attempts from within the group to circumvent the agreement
were not wanting. The blow delivered to the American market, their most
important outlet, was sufficient to break up the combinatio.n. The limb
3SThe pressure of the prosecution in this case was sufficient to cause the abandon-
ment of the whole plan before the entry of the final decree. See J. Com., July 3, 1930,
p. 3, col. 7. Cf. the recent Quebracho case in which the American parties pleaded noto
contendere, but the Department of Justice has in effect admitted its helplessness to
destroy the foreign monopoly. See statement of Assistant Attorney General Wendell
Berge before the Subcommittee on War Mobilization, Committee on Military Affairs
of the Senate, Department of Justice Release, Nov. 24, 1943. A civil suit has since
been instituted. Civil No. 23-510 (S. D. N. Y. 1943).
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that was attacked was so important that the body could not sustain the blow.
Present also was one more important factor. Norwegian sardines are not
a unique commodity as were potash and quinine. There was plenty of
competition from other products. Hence, the sardine packers, unlike the
quinine and potash monopolies, could not safely sit at home and wait for
orders to come to them on their terms.3 9
The effectiveness of antitrust prosecution in this field, therefore, seems
to depend on the answers to these questions: Where is the dominant con-
trol? How tightly knit is it? What other factors--such as competition from
other products--exist as a check upon its ability to remain aloof from active-
market activity here?
3. The agreement cases-These involve situations where, with or with-
out any physical movement of products, there is established by contract a
restraint of trade based on division of sales, territory, control of patents or
processes, pooling of profits, or other variants of agreements not to compete.
This is the type of situation on which the Department of Justice has recently
concentrated. Everything that has been said with respect to the import cases
applies here, but there are some special problems for the defendant, as well
as the government, in this field. Jurisdiction over the foreign defendant is
much more difficult to obtain. A foreign manufacturer, for example, who
is not engaged in business in the United States may not have an office here
and will not be subject to our process. He may, of course, be indicted and
in some cases has been. 40 His goods often cannot be seized. because he ships
none here.
In some recent cases involving this type of violation, the Department has,
however, sued civilly naming only the American parties to the restrictive
contracts who are subject to its jurisdiction as parties defendant. Consent
39American potash competition and substitutes for quinine had not yet developed
at the time of the prosecution.
4OFor criminal cases naming. foreign defendants see: United States v. Aluminum Co.
of America, Criminal No. 109-189 (S. D. N. Y. 1941); United States v. Coming
Glass Works, Criminal No. 108-164 (S. D. N. Y. 1940); United States v. Harbison
Walker Refractories Co., Criminal No. 109-176 (S. D. N. Y. 1941); United States v.
General Aniline & Film Corp., Criminal No. 111-136 (S. D. N. Y. 1941); United
States v. General Electric Co., Criminal No. 108-172 (S. D. N. Y. 1940); United
States v. Tannin Corp., Criminal No. 18-31 (S. D. N. Y. 1942).
Criminal cases excluding foreign defendants: United States v. Allied Chemical &
Dye Corp., Criminal No. 753c (D. C. N. J. 1942) ; United States v. National Lead Co,
Criminal No. 114-455 (S. D. N. Y. 1943) ; United States v. Sumatra Purchasing Corp.,
Criminal No. 15-35-36 (S. D. N. Y. 1918); United States v. Standard Oil Co. (D. C.
N. J. 1942); United States v. E. 1. Dupont de Nemours & Co., Crimina" No. 878-C
(D. C. N. J. 1942).
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decrees have been entered in some of these cases adjudging the contracts
to be illegal and restraining their enforcement. 4'
The adoption of this practice raises a number of questions, both legal and
practical. The first. of these is whether such a decree may properly be en-
tered at all. If a court, at the suit of X is to rule on the validity of a con-
tract between A and B, it would seem that both A and B are necessary
parties defendant. This is certainly the general rule in civil cases in equity.4
In these cases B is not before the court, yet the contract to which he is a
party is declared to be illegal. Such a judgment necessarily cannot be bind-
ing upon the absent party who has not had an opportunity to litigate the
merits. The result of consenting to such a decree may well be to store up
for the conseiting party a reservoir of post-war litigation with the foreign
parties. The American defendant may perhaps believe that the illegality is.
so clear under our law that he could successfully defend an action brought
against him in our courts for non-performance. But such an action might
not be brought in our courts. The contract may, contain provisions for arbi-
tration which may take place abroad. Or, suit may be brought abroad in
a court accustomed to enforce cartel agreements and unacquainted with our
antitrust laws.4 Whatever effect a judgment in a contested action holding
41United States v. Bayer Co., Civil No. 15-365 (S. D. N. Y. 1941); United States
v. Alba Pharmaceutical Co., Inc., Civil No. 15-363 (S. D. N. Y. 1941); United States
v. Schering Corp., Civil No. 1919 (D. C. N. J. 1941); United States v. Synthetic
Nitrogen Products Corp., Civil No. 15-365 (S. D. N. Y. 1941); United States v.
Aluminum Co. of Abnerica, Civil No. 18-31 (S. D. N. Y. 1942); United States v.
Standard Oil Co., Civil No. 2091 (D. C. N. J. 1942).
4Minnesota v. Northern Securities Co, 184 U. S. 199, 22 Sup. Ct. 458 (1902);
Garzot v. Rios de Rubeo, 209 U. S. 283, 28 Sup. Ct 548 (1908); Niles-Bement Pond
Co. v. Iron Moulders' Union, 254 U. S. 77, 41 Sup. Ct. 39 (1920); Commonwealth
Trust Co. v. Smith, 266 U. S. 152, 45 Sup. Ct. 26 (1924).
I PomFRoy, EQurry JuisrxuENcE (5th ed. 1941) § 114.
But cf. Osborn v. Bank of United States, 22 U. S. 738, 6 L. Ed. 204 (1820) ; United
Shoe Machinery Corp. v. United States, 258 U. S. 452, 42 Sup. Ct. 363 (1921).43The contracts attacked by the Government in United States v. Imperial- Chemical
Industries, Ltd., Civil No. 24-13 (S. D. N. Y. 1944), between Imperial, Chemical
Industries and duPont provide:
"XIL ARmRATioN. Should any difference or dispute arise between the parties
hereto touching these Articles of Agreement, or, any clause, matter, or thing relating-
thereto, or as to the rights, duties, or liabilities of either of the parties -hereto, the
same shall be referred to the President for the time being of E. L duPont de Nemours
& Company and the Chairman for the time being of Imperial Chemical Industries
Limited, who shall arbitrate, and their award shall be final. Should they not agree,
they shall appoint an umpire, whose award shall be final and the following provisions
shall apply. If the question or matter to be decided is brought forward by I.C.I., the
umpire shall be European, if, on the contrary, the question or matter to be decided is
brought forward by du Pont, the umpire shall be an American. Should the President
and the Chairman disagree as to the appointment of an umpire, then the umpire if
a European, is to be appointed by the President of the Incorporated Law Society of
England, and if an American to be appointed by the President of the Association of
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such a contract illegal might have, it would seem clear that one entered on
consent would have none at all.
But no absence of parties defendant can prevent the United States from
prosecuting criminally any party within its jurisdiction for violation of its
law. The American party to such an illegal contract is therefore impaled
upon the horns of a dilemma of his own creation. He may attempt to resist
a civil action at the peril of criminal prosecution; or he may yield to the
immediate peril and face the prospect of future actions by the other party
to the contract.
It is also interesting to note that there have been no recent decisions dis-
missing any of these cases as moot. This is somewhat surprising in view of
the success of this defense during the last war.
The seizure technique has not been used recently. There are probably two
reasons for this. Under war conditions the foreign elements of the combina-
tion are often no longer engaged in shipping their products into this country.
Where there are imports, the disruption of trade caused by such seizures
would be most unfortunate in these times.
An interesting variant of the seizure technique was, however, used in
United States v. Aluminum Co. of America.44 Service of process was made
on an alleged agent of I. G. Farbenindustrie A. G.-a foreign defendant.
Upon the failure of the defendant corporation to appear and plead, the gov-
ernment caused a writ of distrngaS45 to issue. Pursuant to the writ, funds
of the foreign defendant on deposit with the National City Bank were seized.
The writ had the desired effect. The foreign defendant filed a notice of
appearance.
The indictment of enemy alien corporations during the war is necessarily
ineffective. Whatever pressure such an indictment might exert during nor-
the Bar of the City of New York."
The decree in United States v. Alba Pharmaceutical Company, Inc., to which only
the American defendants are parties, declares illegal at least five separate agreements.
Of the agreements annexed to the petition one provides that legal proceedings are to be
brought in the court of the domicile of the defendant; two provide for arbitration in
New York in accordance with the rules of the American Arbitration Association; two
provide for arbitration (place not stated) by the International Chamber of Commerce.44Criminal No. 109-189 (S. D. N. Y. 1942).45The writ of distringas was used at common law to enforce the appearance of a
corporation. See Rex v. Mayor and Aldermen of Hartford, 1 Salk. 374, 91 Eng. Rep.
325, 2 Salk. 699, 91 Eng. Rep. 591 (K. B. 1698); Reg. v. Birmingham & Gloucester
Ry Co., 32 B. 223, 11"4 Eng. Rep. 492 (1842) ; State v. Western North Carolina R.R.
Co., 89 N. C. 584 (1883) ; Commonwealth v. Lehigh Valley R.R. Co., 165 Pa. St. 162,
30 At. 836 (1895). 10 FLETCHalR, CvcLoPAEDIA ON CORPORATIONS (Perm. ed. 1931)
4962.
The power to issue writs in aid of process is preserved to the federal courts by statute.
36 STAT. 1162 (1911), 28 U. S. C. 377 (1940). "
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mal times is of course absent now. The corporation could not appear even
if it were desirous of doing so. No uniform policy is followed by the Depart-
ment of Justice with respect to alien parties. In some cases they have been
indicted; in others, not.
46
CONSENT DECREES-SPECIAL CLAUSES
In drafting consent decrees dealing with foreign monopolies, some provi-
sions of general application have emerged. One of these is a clause limiting
the application of the decree to the territorial jurisdiction of the United
States. This clause is a formulation of what the Department of Justice has
heretofore considered to be its jurisdiction under the antitrust laws. It first
appeared in general form in the Quiiine case. It there read :47
Provided, however, that nothing herein contained shall be construed to
restrain or prohibit any defendant from doing any act or entering into
any agreement which is entirely completed outside the United States
and which does not require any act or thing to be done within the
United States.
In one form or another the substance of this clause has been used since
that time in cases in which careful counsel representing defendants has
found it necessary to protect foreign business against coverage by a decree
which would extend beyond the limits of the antitrust laws. Thus, it is
used not merely in cases involving foreign monopolies as such, but by
defendants drafting a decree directed to purely domestic transactions who
desire to except from its operations the foreign aspects of their business
which have not been drawn into question.
48
There are two principal variations of this clause. One form excepts from
the decree the specific situation contemplated by the defendant. 49 In this
respect it may be assimilated to the "permissive clauses"' 0 common in con-
sent decrees. The other exempts
... operations or activities outside the United States, its territories and
46See note 39 supra.47United States v. 383,340 Ounces of Quinine Derivatives, Admiralty No. 98-242
(S. D. N. Y. 1928).48See United States v. Kraft Paper Association, Civil No. 10-329 (S. D. N. Y.
1940) ; United States v. Chrysler Corporation (N. D. Ind. 1938); United States v.
Aluminum Co. of America, Civil No. 18-31 (S. D. N. Y. 1942); United States v.
Imperial Chemical Industries Ltd., Civil No. 17-282 (S. D. N. Y. 1942).49See par. (4) of the Potash decree page 55.
5OBy "permissive clause" is meant a provision of a decree excepting certain situa-




the District of Columbia not violative of the antitrust laws. .... 51
Both these forms would seem to be undesirable. The first gives an illu-
sion of security by apparently approving a specific course of conduct. But
business conditions change rapidly while consent decrees go on forever. It
would seem to be unwise to make an exception of this kind specific and
thereby leave room for doubts when a new plan is found necessary to which
the specific exemption does not apply. The other clause also cuts down the
generality of the exemption to which defendants are entitled by making as
the test of application of the decree the question (always subject to answer
after the event) as to whether the antitrust laws apply. A decree should
not be an injunction against violation of the law, but a specific application
of the law to the facts.52 There is no reason why, if under a given state of
facts, the decree does not apply, these facts should not be stated.
Some new forms of report clauses have recently appeared in consent
decrees dealing with foreign monopolies. By a report clause is meant a
provision of the decree requiring the defendant to report on specified matters
to the Department of Justice. Such a clause has (with one inadvertent ex-
ception) been required by the Department of Justice in -every consent de-
cree since 1939.11 In addition to the standard clause some special clauses
of this kind have been used in foreign monopoly decrees.
The first foreign monopoly decree to have a special report clause was
the Synthetic Nitrogen Products decree.54 In substance it required the de-
fendant to report to the Attorney General "the happening of events and full
data concerning any agreement, combination or cartel mentioned herein,"
if the defendant or its parents, affiliates or subsidiaries should enter into any
agreement which should violate the decree or if the agreement to which
they are parties should become operative in such a way as to resultin a vio-
5 1See United States v. Synthetic Nitrogen Products. Corporation, et at., Civil No.
15-36 (S. D. N. Y. 1941).52United States v. Swift and Co., 196 U. S. 375, 25 Sup. Ct. 276 (1905).
53This clause first appeared in substantially its present form in the decree entered
in United States v. Imperial Wood Stick Company, et at., Civil No. 4-122 (S. D. N. Y.
1939). In substance it provides that for the purpose of securing compliance with the
decree, the Department of Justice may inspect defendants' records or interview its em-
ployees and requires defendants on request to submit reports with respect to matters
contained in the decree. For a more carefully worded form of this clause, see the
decree in United States v. Kraft Paper Association, et al., Civil No. 10-329 (S. D.
N. Y. 1940). For recent forms of this clause, see any decree cited above. In United
States v. Bausch & Lomb Optical Company, et al., - U. S. -- , 64 Sup. Ct. 805
(1944),; the Supreme Court considered this clause and held the provision requiring




lation of the decree. It also provided that the failure of the Attorney General
to take action following the receipt of such information should not be con-
strued as approval or bar the United States from subsequent proceedings.
The benefits to be derived from such a clause are not readily apparent.
In United States v. Schering Corporation,55 the clause reads:
Each defendant company, its successors, subsidiaries, officers and
employees, and all persons acting for or on behalf of said company, is
hereby individually ordered to file with the Department of Justice copies
of all contracts, agreements or arrangements not hitherto filed, affecting
the business of said defendants, and entered into or adhered to by any
company affiliated with or connected with said defendants where said
contracts, agreements or arrangements restrict or determine territories
for sale or the terms or conditions of sale.
Then follows a provision as in the preceding decree relating to the failure
of the Attorney General to take action.
In United States v. Aluminum Company of .America,5 6 the report clause
was made more specific. It is in two parts. The first, directed against I. G.
Farbenindustrie A. G., the villain in most of the new foreign monopoly
cases, enjoins the defendant from entering into any agreement whatever
with that company without filing a copy of the agriement within ten days
with the Department of Justice. The second part requires similar filing of
contracts by Dow. Chemical Co. The United States is thereupon given the
right within forty days to petition the court to declare such agreement in-
valid under Section 2 of the Clayton Act. If the government does not so
proceed, it loses its right under this paragraph.
The special report clause is apparently still in the process of being worked
out, and, as the foregoing extracts show, is being progressively improved.
The form used in the Aluminum Company decree may indicate an attempt
to achieve a system of filing cartel information. The desirability of requiring
such filing by law has been publicly discussed.6 7
CONCLUSION
The extent to which antitrust techniques have been effective in protecting
Americans against foreign combinations has varied with the nature of the
problem presented. Complete effectiveness in all fields is of course not to
be expected. Our jurisdiction is limited to our territory and to acts within
55Civil No. 1919 (D. C. N. J. 1941).
56Civil No. 18-31 (S. D. N. Y. 1942).
57See J. COM., Oct. 27, 1943, p. 1, col. 6; see address by Attorney General Biddle
to Harvard Law School Alumni Association, Feb. 23, 1944.
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it. This slender control has, therefore, as might be expected, been insufficient
in some cases. In others, it has supplied sufficient leverage to procure re-
sults far more favorable than might have been anticipated.
Where control of a commodity produced abroad is held by a tight, well
organized foreign monopoly not subject to our process, a decree has only
partial effectiveness. A reading of the Potash and Quinine decrees is suffi-
dent to show how limited such effectiveness can be. Where the foreign
combination is not too tightly knit, and the American market is important,
as in the Norwegian Sardine case, the decree may be sufficient to break up
the monopoly almost as effectively as though it were wholly subject to our
jurisdiction. Again, as in the recent cases involving patent controls, control
of the American end of the transaction may be sufficient. Certainly, on their
face, the recent decrees would seem to go far to achieve the government's
objectives.
The criminal and forfeiture procedures can have powerful effects. While
at first blush an indictment of a foreign individual not subject to our juris-
diction would seem to be ineffective, experience has shown that the stigma
of criminal prosecution has an effect far beyond the penalty imposed. The
threat of seizure of commodities valued in substantial amounts may well
give the foreigner cause to pause and may induce him to litigate instead of
resting upon his immunity from process. In a peacetime economy, the
possibility of competition from other sources may be decisive.
The effectiveness of the government's attack on cartels, particularly those
under German control, will have to be evaluated after the war. Too much
must not be expected in this field. In a world economic atmosphere of
monopoly, the task of maintaining a free American island is too great a task
for our antitrust laws alone. However, they are in many situations a more
powerful force toward that end than has commonly been believed. The ex-
tent to which this force can be made effective still remains to be seen.
APPENDIX
TABLE OF FOREIGN MONOPOLY CASES
5 8
CASE PROCEEDING DISPOSITION
United States v. ABC Caming Company. Equity Consent Decree
Equity No. 54-93 (S. D. N. Y. 1931)
5 5Preparation of this list has involved questions of judgment with which not all
readers will agree. A number of cases not cited here have involved foreign defendants.
This list is intended to include only those cases which present those special situations
which have been discussed in this article as foreign monopoly cases.
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United States v. Allied Chemical Dye Co.,
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United States v. Allied Chemical Dye Co.,
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United States v. Aluminum Co. of America,
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United States v. Ahminum Co. of America,
Criminal No. 109-189 (S. D. N. Y. 1942)
United States v. Ahnninion Co. of America,
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United States v. Asbestos Corporation Ltd.,
Equity No. 44-268 (S. D. N. Y. 1929)
United States v. Bayer Company,
Civil No. 15-364 (S. D. N. Y. 1941)
United States v. Corning Glass Works,
Criminal No. 108-164 (S. D. N. Y. 1941)
United States v. Deutsches Kalisyndikat
Gesellschaft, Equity No. 41-124
(S. D. N. Y. 1929)
United States v. Diamond Match Co.,
Civil No. 25-397 (S. D. N. Y. 1944)
United States v. E. L Dupont De Nemours,
Criminal No. 876-c (D. C. N. J. 1942)
United States v. General Aniline Co.,
Criminal No. 111-136 (S. D. N. Y. 1941)
United States v. General Electric Co.,
Criminal No. 108-172 (S. D. N. Y. 1940)
United States v. Harbison Walker Refrac-
tories Co., Criminal No. 109-176
(S. D. N. Y. 1941)
United States v. Hamburg Anerican Packet
Co., 239 U. S. 466, 36 Sup. Ct. 212 (1916)
United States v. Imperial Chemical Indus-
tries Lt., Civil No. 24-13 (S. D. N. Y.
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United States v. N. V. Amsterdamsche
Chininefabriek, Equity No. 44-384
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United States v. Merck & Co.,
Civil No. 3159 (D. C. N. J. 1943)
United States v. National Lead Co.,
Criminal No. 114-485 (S. D. N. Y. 1943)
United States v. National Lead Co.,
Civil No. 26-258 (S. D. N. Y. 1944)
United States v. Pacific & Arctic Railway &
Navigation Co., 228 U. S. 87, 33 Sup. Ct.
443 (1913)
United States v. Roche-Organon, Inc.,
Criminal No. 553 (D. C. N. J. 1941)
United States v. Schering Corporation,
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United States v. Schering Corporation,
Criminal No. 550 (D. C. N. J. 1941)
United States v. Swiss Bank,
Civil No. 1920 (D. C. N. J. 1941)
United States v. Sielcken,
Equity No. 9-188 (S. D. N. Y. 1912)
United States v. Sisal Sales Corp.,
274 U. S. 268, 47 Sup. Ct. 592 (1927)
United States v. Standard Oil Company,
Civil No. 2091 (D. C. N. J. 1942)
United States v. Standard Oil Company,
Criminal No. 682 (D. C. N. J. 1942)
United States v. Sumatra Purchasing Co.,
Equity No. 17-317 (S. D. N. Y. 1920)
-United States v. Sumatra Purchasing Co.,
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United States v. Synthetic Nitrogen Products
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United States v. Tannii. Corporation,
Civil No. 23-510 (S. D. N. Y. 1943)
United States v. Julius Weltzien,
Criminal No. 552 (D. C. N. J. 1941)
United States v. 5898 Cases Sardines,
Admiralty No. 105-37 (S. D. N. Y. 1930)
United States v. 383,340 Ounces of Quinine
Derivatives, Admiralty No. 98-242 (S. D.
N. Y. 1928)
Civil Pending
Criminal Pleas of nolo contcndere
and fines
Forfeiture Libel dismissed in view
of consent decree in
U. S. v. ABC Canning
Co.
Forfeiture Libel dismissed in view
of decree in U. S. v.
N. V. Anmterdansche
Chilinefabriek
19441
